






Abstract		The	 affective	 labour	 debate	 has	 become	mainstream	 in	 communications	 studies.	 In	 this	 paper,	 I	suggest	the	Aesthetic	Movement	of	the	late	19th	century	as	inspiration	for	how	users	can	use	Face-book	with	the	knowledge	that	their	data	 is	being	used	for	profit.	 I	present	Facebook	usage	as	art,	creating	an	analog	with	aesthete	Oscar	Wilde’s	essay,	“the	critic	as	artist”	(1891/2010),	where	he	presents	critics	as	artists.	Other	theorists,	especially	Walter	Benjamin	provide	grounding	for	mak-ing	the	argument	that	Facebook	usage	is	an	artistic	expression.	I	then	turn	to	my	inversion	of	Wal-ter	Pater’s	“art	for	art’s	sake”,	the	seminal	idea	of	Aestheticism	and	propose	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	
sake	as	a	method	for	Facebook	use.	While	more	advanced	remuneration	concepts	have	yet	to	arrive	with	such	force	that	they	could	provide	the	proper	payment	to	users,	Facebook	for	its	own	sake	is	a	way	to	appreciate	Facebook’s	beauty	in	the	meantime.	Baudelaire	and	Debord’s	psychogeographic	theories	provide	methods	 for	navigating	 cities	 that	 I	 apply	 to	 examine	Facebook	as	 a	digital	 city.	The	central	claim	of	 this	paper	 is	 the	 following:	By	using	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake,	users	 take	back	some	of	the	dignity	taken	away	from	them	in	the	exploitation	of	free	labour.	Finally,	I	turn	to	critiques	of	Aestheticism	and	how	contemporary	 software	might	provide	 insight	 into	using	Face-book	 in	 an	 ethical	manner.	Users	will	 have	 to	 consider	 each	 action	differently;	 how	would	 liking	something	affect	users’	artistic	expression	of	themselves?	In	this	way,	while	the	affective	labour	de-bate	continues,	users	can	use	Facebook	for	its	own	sake.	
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This	 is	 a	 similar	 concept	 to	 Arvidsson,	 Bauwens,	 and	 Peiterson’s	 (2008)	 ethics	 of	 communities,	shared	 values,	 and	 affective	 relationships	mentioned	 above.	 The	 algorithmic	 process	 Ananny	 de-scribes	 can	be	 seen	as	one	element	within	Arvidsson,	Bauwens,	 and	Peiterson’s	 ethical	 economy.	My	response	to	the	“affective	labour	debate”,	as	I	will	refer	to	it	from	now	on,	is	an	ethical	response	in	which	 algorithms	 are	 viewed	 as	 ethical	 processes,	 such	 as	 those	 in	 Arvidssons,	 Bauwens	 and	Peiterson’s	ethical	economy.	In	this	context,	part	of	the	ethical	process	is	offering	a	usage	where	the	user	 is	 sacrificing	 the	 least	 amount	of	pleasure	despite	Facebook’s	 exploitative	 actions.	The	algo-rithms	are	networked	because	they	connect	different	“actors”	(Johnson,	1988)	to	every	part	of	Fa-cebook	and	the	internet-at-large.	Facebook’s	algorithms	are	NIAs	that	decide	which	ads	to	display,	what	 comes	 up	 in	 News	 Feeds,	 and	 other	 functions	 of	 Facebook.	 Although	 the	 Facebook	 News	Feed’s	algorithm	is	commonly	referred	to	as	EdgeRank,	it	has	moved	on	from	that	system	into	a	far	more	complicated	one	(McGee,	2013).	Facebook’s	NIA	uses	machine	learning	to	make	its	decisions	based	on	approximately	100	000	different	factors	(McGee,	2013).		It	would	be	extremely	difficult	to	question	Facebook’s	NIA	as	to	why	it	makes	certain	decisions.	Frank	Pasquale	 (2015)	 argues	 that	many	algorithms,	 like	 the	ones	Facebook	uses,	 are	 inherently	unknowable.	Machine	 learning	 creates	opaque	black	boxes.	These	algorithms	perform	 their	 func-tions	and	then	create	data	which	Facebook	can	sell	for	profit.	Arvidsson	and	Colleoni	(2012)	argue	that	finding	ways	to	quantify	the	value	from	social	media	use	would	be	quite	difficult,	and	due	to	the	opacity	of	the	black	boxes,	almost	impossible.	Users	are	faced	with	the	question	of	how	to	use	Face-book	knowing	that	their	usage	may	be	exploited	for	profit.	I	suggest	looking	to	the	Aesthetic	Move-ment	as	inspiration	for	how	Facebook	might	be	used	ethically	for	pleasure.	This	differs	 from	other	approaches	 to	digital	 labour	and	exploitation	 for	a	number	of	 reasons.	The	 idea	of	digital	 labour	stems	 from	the	notion	 that	users	are,	 in	 some	manner,	being	 taken	ad-vantage	of	for	value.	Yet,	the	likelihood	of	this	issue	being	resolved	any	time	soon	is	minimal.	The	authors	mentioned	in	this	section	write	about	how	social	media	is	exploitative,	but	solutions	to	this	problem	are	difficult;	answers	are	hard	to	come	by.	If	Arvidsson	and	Colleoni’s	assumption	(2012)	is	correct	and	quantifying	this	value	is	impossible,	then	the	issue	will	never	be	resolved.	Should	the	value	somehow	be	quantified,	then	users	being	paid	out	universal	dividends	may	be	a	possible	solu-tion.	However,	that	may	or	may	not	ever	happen,	and	does	not	seem	likely	to	occur	any	time	soon.	My	 response	 to	 this	debate	 is	not	 to	delete	one’s	Facebook	account	or	 to	 stay	off	 of	 social	media	sites.	Rather,	it	is	to	use	theories	of	art,	urban	experience,	and	others	to	find	a	way	to	use	Facebook	for	maximum	pleasure.	Since	the	exploitation	issue	is	unlikely	to	be	resolved,	my	approach	intends	to	help	users	take	back	some	of	the	dignity	lost	in	exploitation	by	making	the	most	out	of	their	ex-perience	on	Facebook.	Users	are	faced	with	the	question	of	how	to	handle	themselves	knowing	that	their	every	click	is	being	tracked	(Bolin	&	Schwarz,	2015).	Users	may	be	exploited,	but	they	should	not	 let	 that	ruin	 their	experience.	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake	 is	 inspired	by	 the	Aesthetic	Move-ment,	which	I	will	now	turn	to	in	order	to	explain	the	meaning	of	this	statement.		




Walter	Benjamin’s	(1935/1969)	writings	help	to	make	this	jump.	Responding	to	Karl	Marx’s	idea	of	the	superstructure,	and	writing	about	artistic	 labour	in	photography	and	film,	Benjamin	argues	that	as	technologies	change,	we	need	to	re-evaluate	what	constitutes	art.	For	Benjamin,	works	of	art	like	photography	and	film	lose	their	auras,	or	unique	qualities,	in	the	way	that	they	are	reproduced.	When	images	are	reproduced,	they	become	less	about	art	and	more	about	copying	the	original.	De-spite	the	loss	of	aura,	to	Benjamin,	these	are	still	works	of	art,	and	one	can	find	pleasure	in	their	re-productions.		I	argue	that	Facebook	usage	has	a	Benjaminian	aura.	In	many	ways,	Facebook	use	is	the	very	def-inition	of	Benjamin’s	mechanical	reproduction.	It	is	reproducible	and	there	is	a	way	to	find	pleasure	in	it.	At	first	glance	a	‘like’	can	be	counted	as	an	identical,	quantifiable	unit	in	a	uniform	way	across	Facebook,	and	 in	 that	way	 it	 is	 reproducible.	Kylie	 Jarrett’s	 (2014)	response	develops	 this	better.	For	her,	the	‘like’	button	may	be	reproducible	in	its	quantifiable	unit,	but	what	it	represents	is	not	totally	 reproducible.	 Jarrett	 explains	 that	 the	 affective	 relationship	 that	 surpasses	 the	 quantified	data	point	is	not	reproducible	and	is	only	partly	captured	in	the	reproducible	‘like’.	Looking	at	Fa-cebook	usage	as	reproducible	art,	Jarrett’s	analysis	works	well.	To	continue	 the	analogy,	Kietzmann,	Hermkens,	McCarthy,	 and	Silvestre	 (2011)	 identify	 seven	functional	building	blocks	of	social	media:	identity,	conversations,	sharing,	presence,	relationships,	reputation,	and	groups.	 In	expressing	oneself	on	social	media,	 these	building	blocks	can	all	be	 in-herently	creative.	Online	identities	require	creative	composition	by	cultivating	these	well-thought-out	 identities.	 Even	 regular	 users	 compose	 their	 online	 identities	 through	 conscious	 and	 uncon-scious	online	decisions	(Kaplan	&	Haelein,	2010).	Conversations	are	creative:	every	word	that	a	us-er	 types	 is	a	kind	of	 creative	expression.	Choosing	which	photos,	videos,	or	 statuses	 to	share	 is	a	creative	choice.	Each	item	posted	online	is	a	part	of	the	tapestry	of	an	online	identity.	A	user’s	pres-ence,	or	the	way	the	user	shows	up	online,	is	creative.	When	a	certain	user’s	presence	is	apparent	on	a	timeline,	it	is	representative	of	user	choices.	The	way	Facebook	defines	relationships	and	the	way	users	choose	which	relationship	statuses	best	fit	a	certain	relationship	are	creative	acts.	Repu-tation,	or	the	way	people	are	perceived,	is	part	of	the	creative	cultivation	of	an	online	presence.	Fi-nally,	groups	provide	a	forum	to	express	all	of	these	creative	social	media	building	blocks	amongst	fellow	users.		The	 previous	 paragraph	 shows:	 Facebook	 users	 act	 creatively.	 Their	 created	 identities	 are	unique	and	therefore	not	reproducible.	 Just	as	Benjamin	considered	photography	and	filmmaking	as	art,	Facebook	use	can	be	rethought	of	as	art.	Unlike	his	idea	of	photography	and	filmmaking,	so-cial	media	 use	 is	 difficult	 to	 replicate.	 Its	 close	 ties	 to	 a	 user’s	 identity,	 one	 of	 Kietzmann	 et	 al.’s	building	blocks	 (2011),	make	 social	media,	 and	 specifically	Facebook,	 a	unique	expression.	Every	time	 a	 user	makes	 a	 decision	 online,	 the	 user	 is	 deliberately	 fostering	 their	 online	 expression	 of	themselves.			
Facebook	for	Facebook’s	Sake	





Matthew	 Arnold	 (1865/2010)	 believed	 that	 the	 critic	 had	 a	 divine	 duty	 to	 find	 morality	 in	 art.	While	 the	Victorians	were	 concerned	with	highly	 ornamental	 and	 symbolic	 art,	 Pater	 started	 the	Aesthetic	Movement	that	suggested	art	was	about	beauty	and	finding	pleasure	in	that	beauty.	Pater	empowers	his	readers	to	find	their	own	meaning	in	art	and	challenges	the	Victorian	notion	of	imbu-ing	morality	in	every	facet	of	a	piece	of	art.	In	The	Picture	of	Dorian	Gray	(1890),	Wilde	writes	that	“All	art	is	quite	useless”	(Wilde	&	Elfenbein	2007,	p.	4).	For	the	Aesthetics,	art	exists	for	its	own	rea-son,	not	for	any	other	uses.	Facebook	may	have	a	purpose	unto	itself	as	well.	The	Aesthetic	Movement’s	rejection	of	Victorian	morality	is	important.	If	users	are	to	use	Face-book	 for	 its	own	sake,	 they	must	acknowledge	 their	exploitation.	Using	Facebook	 for	purposes	of	pleasure	is	not	an	ignorant	decision.	It	is	a	decision	to	use	Facebook	for	pleasure	despite	exploita-tion.	This	is	not	giving	in	to	the	capitalist	rule	of	a	major	platform,	but	it	can	be	seen	as	a	rebellion.	Just	 like	the	Aesthetic	Movement	responded	to	Victorian	morality,	Aesthetic	Facebook	use	is	a	re-jection	of	 the	 idea	 that	a	response	 to	exploitation	 is	needed	 immediately.	This	ethical	 response	 is	can	be	 read	as	 follows:	although	NIAs	have	exploited	 the	communities,	 values,	 and	affective	 rela-tionships	on	Facebook,	some	of	the	indignity	aroused	by	exploitation	can	be	taken	back	by	finding	the	greatest	possible	pleasure	in	Facebook	usage.	This	is	a	rebellion	on	multiple	levels.	To	begin	with,	using	Facebook	for	pleasure	is	a	rewarding	act.	The	discourses	around	the	exploitative	aspects	make	some	users	feel	guilty.	In	contrast	to	other	research	that	recommends	obfuscation,	deleting	accounts,	or	completely	swearing	off	social	media,	










	The	ethics	of	Aestheticism	offers	possible	answers	for	how	Aestheticism	may	be	an	ethical	answer	to	resist	exploitation	of	free	labour.	The	Aesthetic	object	offers	a	useless	pleasure,	because	defining	it,	 and	making	 sense	 of	 it,	would	 also	 create	 a	 usage-value	 (Buchan,	 1999).	 Aesthetic	 pleasure	 is	useless	in	that	it	does	not	seek	to	accomplish	anything	other	than	itself.	In	consequence,	my	argu-ment	 is	more	of	a	stopgap	answer	 than	a	direct	answer	 to	exploitation.	 In	 the	same	way	 that	 the	Victorians	gave	rise	to	the	Aesthetic	Movement,	exploitation	on	social	media	gives	rise	to	Facebook	
for	Facebook’s	sake.	Victorianism	sought	 to	 find	 truth	 in	all	 art,	while	 the	Aesthetic	Movement	 re-jected	 the	notion	 that	 art	 had	 to	 have	 truth	 at	 all.	 In	 the	 same	way,	 I	 reject	 that	 Facebook	usage	should	have	 its	own	didactic	purpose,	 like	every	aspect	of	 the	Victorian	movement.	Rather,	using	Facebook	purely	 for	pleasure	 is	a	way	to	 find	beauty	 in	 it	without	making	a	moral	statement	that	might	affect	how	much	pleasure	a	user	actually	receives	from	the	platform.	Again,	the	exploitation	issue	exists,	so	how	should	users	conduct	themselves	online	today?		
Psychogeography	
	Up	until	this	point,	we	looked	at	creative	expressions	through	Facebook	such	as	outputting	statuses	and	pictures	and	we	argued	 that	 theses	expressions	 could	be	 considered	art.	However,	Facebook	use	that	does	not	necessarily	involve	this	kind	of	direct	expression.	To	explain	this	argument,	I	turn	to	 psychogeography.	 Pyschogeography	 designates	 the	 playful	 navigation	 of	 urban	 environments	and	is	a	good	site	for	more	information	on	using	Facebook	in	an	Aesthetic	manner.	The	two	theories	of	psychogeography	that	I	will	apply	to	Facebook	come	from	Symboliste	Aesthetic	theorist,	Charles	Baudelaire,	and	French	Marxist	situationist,	Guy	Debord.	These	psychogeographical	 theories	offer	two	methods	of	using	Facebook	for	pleasure.	In	Baudelaire’s	critical	essay,	“the	painter	of	modern	life”	(1863/2010),	he	describes	the	artist	as	the	flâneur,	an	artist	whose	perfection	is	in	joining	crowds	in	cities.	Baudelaire’s	artist	blends	in	by	joining	with	others.	“He	is	an	‘I’	with	an	insatiable	appetite	for	the	‘non-I’”,	he	writes	(1863/2010,	p.	684).	The	flâneur	is	a	window	shopper	in	Paris,	but	also	watches	people.	He	joins	the	crowd,	but	is	still	observational,	like	in	Edgar	Allan	Poe’s	1840	short	story,	“The	Man	of	the	Crowd”.	The	narrator	observes	a	crowd	and	then,	in	his	fascination	with	an	old	man,	he	follows	the	old	man	and	in	turn	joins	the	crowd.	Facebook	can	be	 constituted	as	a	 contemporary	version	of	Baudelaire’s	 crowd.	 Some	of	Kietz-mann	 et	 al.’s	 building	 blocks	 (2011)	 can	 make	 that	 connection	 through	 presence,	 sharing,	 and	groups.	Everyone	in	the	crowd	shares	their	connection	to	the	group	by	being	present.	A	flâneur	on	social	media	 is	 not	 an	 influencer	 because	 they	 blend	 into	 the	 crowd.	 This	 user	 is	 one	who	 seeks	beauty	 in	simple	 interactions	shared	with	the	masses.	The	Facebook	 flâneur	takes	part	 in	memes,	group	discussions,	and	keeps	up	with	 the	 latest	 trends	on	the	platform.	By	 joining	 the	crowd,	 the	
flâneur	expresses	himself	in	his	appetite	for	that	which	is	outside	of	himself.		This	is	part	of	the	rebellion	of	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake.	By	finding	the	most	pleasure	in	the	platform,	users	can	reject	the	drive	to	become	an	influencer,	someone	who	makes	themselves	the	center	of	 attention.	The	attention	 seeking	would	 contradict	 the	Aesthetic	principal	of	using	Face-book	 for	Facebook’s	sake:	seeking	attention	comes	with	moral	stances.	By	contrast,	 the	Facebook	




counter	the	idea	of	disappearing	into	the	crowd,	or	becoming	something	outside	of	oneself.	By	join-ing	the	crowd,	users	actually	reject	their	unique	digital	 footprints.	The	digital	flâneur	explores	Fa-cebook	despite	being	tracked.	By	not	allowing	the	exploitation	to	guide	his	usage	through	any	other	prescribed	methods,	the	flâneur	rebels	against	those	exploiting	his	labour.	Another	psychogeographic	 theory	that	enables	one	to	explore	Aesthetic	Facebook	use	 is	Situa-tionist	and	French	Marxist	 theorist	Guy	Debord’s	derivé	 (1956).	The	derivé	is	Debord’s	suggestion	for	rapid	movement	through	a	city.	It	is	an	unplanned	strategy	for	exploration	in	which	people	are	drawn	 by	 things	 that	 attract	 them,	 an	 example	 of	 Aesthetic	 thinking	 at	 work.	 Debord’s	 subjects	could	be	drawn	in	by	beauty,	finding	the	sights	that	are	the	most	pleasing	to	engage	with	and	look	at.	This	provides	a	fitting	framework	for	pleasureable	Facebook	usage.	Aesthetic	Facebook	use	re-quires	users	to	seek	out	what	makes	them	the	happiest.	Like	with	Baudelaire	and	Facebook,	users	can	explore	the	platform	in	the	sense	of	Debord’s	idea.	The	flâneur	represents	more	of	a	lurker	on	Facebook:	 someone	who	explores	 the	platform	without	 taking	 action	 and	participating	 in	 the	 ac-tions	 that	 communities	 deem	 pleasurable.	 The	 derivé	takes	 a	more	 active	 approach:	 deliberately	seeking	out	pleasurable	images	and	interactions	on	Facebook.	The	derivé	will	happily	click	on	any-thing	that	piques	his	interest.	Paying	no	mind	to	the	masses,	the	derivé	finds	pleasure	in	exploring	the	digital	landscape	on	a	whim.		Others	might	critique	this	argument	by	saying	Facebook’s	algorithms	shape	the	derivé’s	digital	landscape.	While	 it	 is	 true	 that	algorithms	determine	what	occurs	on	one’s	homepage,	 the	derivé,	has	full	autonomy	in	choosing	what	pleases	him.	Although	the	algorithm	is	exploitative,	in	the	long-term,	 it	uses	machine	 learning	 to	better	display	 the	most	pleasurable	 landscape	 for	 the	derivé.	In	this	way	he	might	be	able	to	better	explore	the	geography	of	his	News	Feed.	If	the	Aesthetic	Face-book	 user	 can	 find	more	 pleasure,	 they	 are	 successful.	 Like	 the	Aesthetics	 rejected	 the	 Victorian	need	to	find	morality,	the	Aesthetic	ethic	here	is	not	to	change	a	user’s	actions	based	on	finding	mo-rality.	When	the	Aesthetic	Facebook	user	finds	beauty,	the	user	takes	back	some	of	the	power	that	Facebook	may	have	taken	by	dictating	their	usage.		The	argument	 that	 rejecting	Facebook	 completely	 as	 a	more	effective	 form	of	 rebellion	 is	 fair.	However,	in	its	own	way,	refraining	from	Facebook	is	still	interacting	with	the	platform.	Nobel	Prize	winner	 J.M.	 Coetzee	 offers	 some	 insight.	 His	 novel,	Waiting	 for	 the	 Barbarians	 (1980),	 received	some	negative	attention	because	several	critics	believed	that	it	allegorized	Apartheid	without	Coet-zee	identifying	Apartheid	as	his	subject.	In	his	1986	essay,	“Into	the	Dark	Chamber”,	Coetzee	writes	a	thinly	veiled	response:	“For	the	writer	the	deeper	problem	is	not	to	allow	himself	to	be	impaled	on	 the	dilemma	proposed	by	 the	state,	namely,	either	 to	 ignore	 its	obscenities	or	else	 to	produce	representations	of	them.”	(p.	13).	For	Coetzee,	writing	about	the	transgressions	that	an	ideological	body	creates	 is	still	working	within	the	 ideology.	Rejecting	social	media	 is	still	 interacting	with	 it,	too.	Refusing	to	use	Facebook	is	making	a	decision	based	on	the	fact	that	Facebook	itself	has	dictat-ed	to	you.	By	exploring	the	psychogeography	of	Facebook,	users	can	find	more	pleasure	than	com-pletely	ignoring	the	platform.	This	is	not	to	equate	or	compare	the	South	African	Apartheid	to	Face-book’s	exploitation	of	free	labour.	Coetzee’s	argument	does,	however,	present	legitimate	reasoning	that	choosing	not	to	participate	is	still	a	choice	dictated	by	the	ideological	body	governing	participa-tion.		
Nietzsche’s	Critique	of	Aestheticism	




Movement	in	Twilight	of	the	Idols	(1889).	In	section	twenty-four	of	the	chapter	entitled	“Skirmishes	of	an	Untimely	Man”	Nietzsche	rebukes	Aestheticism.	After	Pater	describes	his,	“L’art	pour	l’art,”	as	a	fight	against	morality’s	tendency	to	create	prejudice,	Nietzsche	makes	the	argument	that	Aestheti-cism	 creates	 its	 own	kind	of	 prejudices.	 For	 him,	 if	 Aestheticism	 is	 searching	 for	 beauty,	 relative	beauty	will	create	something	ugly.	This	is	not	a	Victorian	critique.	Nietzsche	does	not	vindicate	art	without	morality,	the	art	of	Aestheticism,	as	lacking	virtue.	Rather,	he	is	arguing	that	the	same	mor-al	divisions	that	Victorianism	created	are	also	created	in	Aestheticism.	If	everyone	is	seeking	pleas-ure	and	beauty,	then	users	are	going	to	be	divided	into	groups	that	determine	the	users’	worth	on	social	media.	In	Nietzsche’s	thinking,	the	exploitation	of	affective	labour	would	be	replaced	with	the	unfair	and	subjective	demarcation	between	what	 is	beautiful	and	what	 is	not.	For	Aesthetic	Face-book	use	to	search	for	beauty,	it	might	have	to	demarcate	what	is	ugly	as	well.	Nietzsche	would	not	say	that	this	is	a	problem,	but	a	symptom	of	Aestheticism.	To	avoid	this	dilemma,	Aesthetic	Facebook	usage	will	have	to	be	more	about	finding	pleasure	in	one’s	own	outputs	than	how	other	people	are	interacting	with	the	platform.	The	most	important	of	Kietzmann	et	al.’s	(2011)	building	blocks	is	identity.	If	users’	expressions	of	themselves	have	auras	that	cannot	be	duplicated,	then	no	one	will	be	able	to	compete	with	a	user	for	the	expression	of	that	user’s	identity.	Nietzsche’s	criticism	of	Aestheticism	highlighting	that	which	is	unappealing	will	be	avoided	because	users	inspired	by	Aestheticism	will	be	focusing	on	themselves	and	not	competing	with	others.		This	response	to	Nietzsche’s	critique	may	create	some	issues	with	the	psychogeographical	theo-ries.	If	finding	pleasure	in	one’s	own	outputs	works,	then	users	would	not	be	able	to	interact	with	other	people.	Specifically,	with	the	case	of	 the	 flâneur,	users	would	not	be	able	to	 join	a	crowd	or	community	because	they	would	be	focused	on	themselves.	This	critique	might	stop	participation	in	Facebook	at	all.	By	 its	very	nature,	Facebook	 involves	 interacting	with	other	people.	A	distinction	needs	to	be	made	between	rejecting	the	idea	of	a	competitive	landscape	and	rejecting	Facebook	al-together.	Facebook	for	Facebook’s	sake	 rejects	 the	notion	 that	a	user	has	 to	be	an	 influencer	or	 to	acquire	 some	kind	of	 social	 value	 in	an	economy	of	 reputation.	 In	 reality,	 interacting	with	others	does	not	have	to	mean	competing	with	them.	If	users	recognizing	their	own	Facebook	usage	or	in-teractions	as	ugly,	they	can	learn	to	rectify	them.		
The	Facebook	Demetricator	




if	users	base	their	actions	and	explorations	on	the	platform	on	what	they	really	think,	rather	than	on	an	attempt	to	be	a	better	user	than	the	next	person.		By	creating	the	Demetricator,	Grosser	wanted	to	explore	Facebook	without	its	metrics.	He	is	in-terested	in	how	the	visible	metrics,	on	a	site	that	depends	on	its	users’	free	labour,	are	important	to	success.	Grosser	(2016)	asks	what	happens	when	quality,	not	quantity	is	foremost.	His	browser	ex-tension	is	partially	a	response	to	the	affective	labour	debate.	Using	the	Facebook	Demetricator	is	an	effective	way	to	use	Facebook	for	its	own	sake	while	avoiding	the	creation	of	the	ugly	that	Nietzsche	thought	Aestheticism	promotes.	A	user	can	still	join	a	crowd,	as	a	Facebook	flâneur,	because	objects	on	Facebook	will	 still	 say	 “people”,	but	 the	user	will	not	know	how	many	people	 like	 that	object.	This	can	lead	to	a	more	reflexive	use	of	Facebook:	users	might	have	to	rethink	what	kind	of	crowd	they	want	to	join,	because	each	action	can	be	considered	differently	based	on	how	it	affects	the	us-ers’	artistic	expression	of	himself	or	herself.	Using	 the	Demetricator	also	helps	users	 to	avoid	 the	draw	to	become	an	influencer.	Bolin	and	Schwarz	(2015)	call	this	the	metricated	mindset,	a	mindset	in	which	 the	metrics	displayed	on	 screen	privilege	 certain	 actions	 and	punish	others.	 Part	 of	 the	power	that	influencers	acquire	is	in	their	greater	number	of	followers	and	interactions	than	other	users.	Taking	the	metricated	mindset	out	of	Facebook	makes	it	more	pleasurable	for	other	users.			
Acknowledging	Exploitation		
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